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@@ $UT UTIONAL LAW
DONALD L. BESCHLE
NEIL J. FOGARTY
PETER JUDE NIEMIEC

I
FREEDOM

OF

EXPRESSION:

FLAG

ABUSE STATUTES

UFJ NITED STATES involvement in Vietnam had a dramatic effect

on many American institutions. It sparked widespread demonstrations by supporters and protesters who often used the American flag to
aid them in expressing their views. Although this conduct became the

focus of frequent state and federal litigation challenging the validity
of regulatory statutes,' the Supreme Court actually addressed the issue
for the first time in

1974.2

The 1969 case of Street v. New York

presented

the Court with

an opportunity to speak to the validity of flag abuse statutes. Street
contended that his burning a flag on a New York street corner in pro-

test of the shooting of James Meredith was protected by the first amendment as a valid form of expression. The Court, however, did not reach
that question, reversing his conviction on the ground that the statute
was overbroad.4 Street contained the clear implication that states could
continue to enforce flag abuse statutes directed exclusively against nonverbal conduct. 5
Received for publication December 1. 1974.
Donald L. Beschle, Neil J. Fogarty and Peter Jude Nieiniec are staff members
of the Annual Survey of American Law. Mr. Beschle wrote "Freedom of Expression:
Flag Abuse Statutes." Mr. Fogarty wrote "Freedom of the Press: Libcl." Mr. Niemiec
wrote "Due Process: Criminal Jurisdiction by Kidnapping."
1. Flag abuse litigation was almost nonexistent in the period between World
War II and the Vietnam War. For an historical sketch of flag abuse statutes and
litigation, see Rosenblatt, Flag Desecration Statutes: History and Analysis, 1972 Wash.
U.L.Q. 193.
For purposes of this article. "abuse" will be used to refer to all forms of prohibited behavior regarding the flag; "'desecration" will be used to refer only to those
actions impairing the physical integrity of the flag (e.g.. burning. tearing): and "'improper use" will indicate those actions short of interference with the flag's
physical
integrity.
2. The only previous Supreme Court statement on the issue was Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907), which had affirmed the state's right to prohibit commercial
use of the flag.
3. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
4. Id. at 585-94.
5. The Court found the New York statute making it a crime to "cast contempt
upon [the flag] ...either by words or act" (N.Y. Penal Law § 1423(16)(d) (1909).
superseded by N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 136(d) (McKinney 1967)). clearly %iolacd the first
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The inevitable need to decide the questions left open in Streeto
was finally satisfied last year in Smith v. Goguen7 and Spence v. Washington.8 In Goguen, the Court overturned a conviction under the Massachusetts flag abuse statute on the ground that the statute was impermissibly vague. In Spence, decided three months later, the Court for
the first time asserted that the first amendment protects expressive,
albeit nonverbal, conduct toward the flag.
On January 30, 1970, police officers in the downtown business
district of Leominster, Massachusetts, saw Valarie Goguen wearing a
four-by-six-inch American flag sewn to the seat of his pants. A complaint was filed against Goguen under the Massachusetts flag abuse
statute, which applies to "whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon,
defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the United States." 0 It
did not charge Goguen with any act of physical desecration, but asserted only that he "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of the
United States."' 0 His subsequent conviction was affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.'" Goguen's release from custody, however, was ordered on a writ of habeas corpus by a federal district court,
which found the provisions under which he had been convicted unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 12 The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed the order.1 3
Reaching no other question, the Supreme Court affirmed on the
ground of vagueness.' 4 Any statute which makes behavior criminal
must give fair notice of exactly those actions being prohibited.', Noting
amendment in its effort to punish words. 394 U.S. at 590-94. In separate dissents, four
Justices stated their belief that Street had been convicted for his actions, not his
words, and that a state clearly could regulate actions directed toward the flag.
Among the dissenters was no less a defender of first amendment rights than Justice
Black. For an example of post-Street flag abuse prosecutions, see People v. Radich,
26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30 (1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court,
401 U.S. 531 (1971).
6. A hint that the Court was merely waiting for the first amendment issue to
present itself came in an opinion by Justice Harlan, in which he was joined by
Justice Brennan, concurring in the dismissal of the appeal in Cowgill v. California,
396 U.S. 371 (1970). He stated that the record had not indicated whether the
action of the appellant in cutting up a flag and wearing it as a vest had any
"recognizable communicative aspect," thereby making decision of the issue inappropriate. Id. at 371-72.
7. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
8. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
9. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 264, § 5 (1971).
10. 415 U.S. at 570.
11. Commonwealth v. Goguen, 279 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1972).
12. Goguen v. Smith, 343 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1972).
13. Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1973).
14. 415 U.S. at 572-73.
15. See, e.g., Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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that casual use of the flag has become widespread, the Court reasoned
that the statute could not have intended to make every informal use
of the flag a criminal act. Furthermore, nothing in the statute, or
in any state judicial interpretation, gave law enforcement personnel any
guidance in its application. The police and courts were thus "free to
react to nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of
the flag."' 6
Although the Court spoke directly only to the problem of vagueness, the per se validity of flag abuse statutes was referred to in dicta,
as well as in the separate concurrence of Justice White'- and the dissents of Justice Blackmun,S in which Chief Justice Burger joined, and
Justice Rehnquist. 19 After finding the Massachusetts statute impermissibly vague, the Court stated that "[c]ertainly nothing prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what constitutes forbidden
treatment of United States flags."' 20 The Court referred specifically to
the federal flag desecration statute as exemplary, 2 1 giving no hint that
flag abuse statutes might be found inherently constitutionally objectionable.
On May 10, 1970, only a few days after the invasion of Cambodia
and the shootings at Kent State University, a college student in Seattle
was arrested and charged with a violation of Washington's "improper
use" statute-2 for hanging a United States flag, with a peace symbol
16. 415 U.S. at 578.
17. Justice White specifically endorsed the validity of wiell-drawn laws regulating
the use of the flag. Massachusetts, he contended, has the right to prohibit "treatment"
of the flag, but not to use as the touchstone of a criminal violation the question of
whether that treatment is "contemptuous." 415 U-S. at 587-90. That approach usould
not punish the conduct, but rather the accompanming idea. Justice White would.
however, uphold a statute which proscribed only conduct, without regard to its
message.
18. Justice Blackmun contended that Goguen was being prosecuted for harming
the physical integrity of the flag by wearing it on his pants, not for engaging in an
communicative conduct. Punishment for this kind of ph-sical desecration, he stated.
does not violate the Constitution. 413 U.S. at 590-91.
19. Justice Rehnquist's dissent pointed out the lack of any hint in the record
that Goguen had intended a specific message bN his conduct. 415 U.S. at 593. ECn
had there been such evidence, however, Rehnquist contended that tie govrnncrit
may still regulate use of the flag as legitimately as it may regulate tihe use of such
private property as firearms or controlled drugs, if it determines that such regulation
is in the public interest. Id. at 595.

20. Id. at 581-82.
21. Id. at 582 n.30. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1968) pro%ides:
Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon azn. flag of tileUnited States by publicly mutilating, defacing. defiling, burning, or trampling upon it Shall be filed
not more than $1000 or imprisoned for not mnre than one %ear. or both.
22. Wash. Re%. Code § 9.86.020 (1956), which proides in pait: **No cr)on shall
...place or cause to be placed any word. figiue. mark. picture. design, dra%%itg or
advertisement of anN nature upon an

flag . . . of the United State,,."
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of removable black tape attached to it, upside clown in the window
of his apartment.23 At his trial, defendant Spence testified that iehad
displayed the flag in protest of Cambodia and Kent State, and that he
had intended to associate the flag with peace rather than war. 2 Spence
was convicted following a charge to the jury which indicated that the
act of displaying a flag with a peace symbol attached was sufficient to
convict.2 5 The conviction was reversed by the Washington Court of
Appeals, 20 only to be reinstated by the Washington Supreme Court.2 7
In a per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court reversed "on the ground that as applied to appellant's activity the Washington statute impermissibly infringed protected expression." 28 Finding
it undisputed that Spence had availed himself of a means of communication by displaying the flag, the Court was faced with the issue of
whether any valid governmental interest justifies interference with that
expression.
The Search for a Valid State Interest.-Taken by itself, Smith v.
Goguen does not prevent state regulation of flag abuse; it merely requires that such statutes be drawn with greater specificity than was the
Massachusetts misuse statute, which is comparable to those of a number
of states.2 9 Although the Supreme Court was not the first to adopt this
view, 30 the judiciary has stopped short of implying that a legislature
cannot draw a sufficiently specific statute. Nor has any state seen the
invalidation of its desecration statute, invariably a more specific provision than the accompanying misuse statute.3 ' It is Spence which raises
23. 418 U.S. at 406.
24. Id. at 408. The Court accepted as undisputed the fact that appellant "wanted
people to know that [he] thought America stood for peace." Id.
25. Id.
26. State v. Spence, 5 Wash. App. 752, 490 P.2d 1321 (1971).
27. State v. Spence, 81 Wash. 2d 788, 506 P.2d 293 (1973).
28. 418 U.S. at 406.
29. For a list of state flag abuse statutes, see note 76 infra.
30. In 1973, a New Jersey court found that state's misuse statute oierly broad
in State v. Zimmelnan. 62 N.J. 279, 301 A.2d 129 (1973). Because the statute could
just as easily be used to prosecute people for patriotic uses of the flag, as for those
uses which the state might wiell
have a valid interest in regulating, the court found
it unconstitutional. Commentators have noted that flag abuse statutes hase been used
only to prosecute statements of political dissent. See, e.g., Note, 66 Mich. L,.Rev.
1040, 1056 (1968).
Also in 1973, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the Connecticut
flag abuse statute invalid for its use of the overly broad term "misuse" as one of
the activities prohibited in treatment of the flag. Thorns v. Heffernan, 473 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1973). Although the United States Supreme Court remanded for further consideration in light of Spence (Heffernan v. Thoms, 418 U.S. 908 (1974)), it isdoubtful that the outcome of the case will be affected.
31. For a discussion of the validity of current flag abuse stat, ,s, see notes 76.81
infra and accompanying text.
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serious doubts about the state's power to prosecute under any statute
for misuse, and contains implications for flag desecration prosecutions
as well. Even after Spence, however, there appears to be a residual area
of activity which may still be regulated by a well-drawn flag abuse
statute.
For a defendant to invoke Spence, it seems clear that his activity
must include some recognizably communicative content. The Spence
Court stressed the importance of the clear conveyance of a message,
pointing out "that this was not an act of mindless nihilism."3 - A defendant who cannot clearly establish that his acts were meant to convey
a message will probably be unable to rely on Spence. The case-by-case
adjudication which may be necessary to determine what constitutes "a
particularized message" is reminiscent of the Court's approach to the
issue of obscenity, an approach which has offered little guidance to
lower courts and subsequent litigants. 33 However, even the presence of
such communicative intent will not bar a conviction for violating the
statute, if the countervailing state interest is sufficiently important or
substantial.
In the 1968 case of United States v. O'Brien,34 the Supreme Court
addressed the validity of statutes which regulate conduct containing both
speech and nonspeech elements. The statute under which O'Brien was
prosecuted for burning his draft card makes it an offense to destroy,
mutilate, alter or forge a Selective Service registration certificate35
O'Brien claimed that enforcement of the statute infringed his first
amendment right of free speech by prohibiting this form of protest.
The O'Brien Court found a substantial government interest sufficient to justify regulation of expressive conduct in the administrative
convenience of draft cards for the Selective Service System and its local

32. 418 U.S. at 410.
A flag bearing a peace symbol and displayed upside down by a student toda-

might be interpreted as nothing more than bizarre behavior, but it would hasc
been difficult for the great majority of citizens to miss the drift of appellant's
point at the time that he made it.
Id.
33. In the recent decision of Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). the Supreme
Court seemed to be signaling a retreat from its articulated position in Miller %.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), in which it had allowed local connitlies ahnuoSt uinlimited freedom to determine what is *'patently offensihe." By ruling that ecn a
properly charged jury could not find certain material obscene (418 U.S. at 160). tile
Court evidenced a commitment to the proposition that it has the ultimate po%%cr to
decide whether a particular instance of cxpiession qualifies for the protection of tile
first amendment.
34. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
35. 50 U.S.C. § 462(b) (1970).
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boards. 30 Because the government interest in administrative efficiency
is not present in flag abuse cases, the Court will have to find another
valid government interest to satisfy the O'Brien analysis-something it
37
was unable to do in Spence.
Breach of the Peace.-The strongest justification for the prohibition
against flag abuse seems to be a state's interest in preserving public
order. While Justice Harlan's warning that "insults to the flag have
been the cause of war" 8 may sound somewhat anachronistic, the flag's
ability to convey strong emotional messages can easily carry with it the
possibility that public insult to the flag will promote violence.
Even pure speech has been found subject to regulation in those
limited instances3 0 where the utterance constitutes a "clear and present
danger," rather than merely "induces a condition of unrest" or "even
stirs people to anger." 40 The Court's decision to give great leeway to
the exercise of first amendment rights, even when they run afoul of the
interest of public peace, is best demonstrated by Brandenburg v. Ohio4l
and Cohen v. California.42 Brandenburg involved the prosecution of a
Ku Klux Klan leader who had advocated the duty and necessity of
criminal actions to further the cause of white supremacy. While conceding the state's power to punish for inciting to riot, the Court distinguished the instant situation as having been one where the jury had
not been required to find clear danger or imminent lawless action,
but had been improperly allowed to convict merely for the abstract
advocacy of the propriety and necessity of violence. 43
Defendant Cohen had been convicted under a "disturbing the
peace" statute for wearing a jacket inscribed with the words "Fuck the
36. 391 U.S. at 378-82.
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the government interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Id. at 377.
37. 418 U.S. at 412-13.
38. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. at 41.
39. States may not regulate pure speech unless the words arc (I) by their %Cry
nature an infliction of injury or a spur to an immediate breach of the peace, (2)
not an essential part of the exposition of an idea, and (3) of very slight social value
as weighed against the state's interest in order. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
40. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). See also Gitlow v. New YoiLk,
268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting), for a reminder that "e~ery idea
is an incitement."
41. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
42. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
43. 395 U.S. at 447.
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Draft" while in a courthouse. Since walking through a courthouse is
not itself criminal, the Court reasoned that the conviction had to have
been based on the inscribed words alone. Therefore, the standard became the strict one of "fighting words," in light of which Cohen's
44
conviction could not stand.
The key distinction between the Brandenburg/Cohen line of decisions and the flag abuse cases is, of course, that the latter have not
been characterized as "pure speech," but rather as symbolic speech or
"speech-plus." Where speech is accompanied by conduct, states have
greater latitude in defending their interests by legislation.
An absolutist whenever freedom of speech was involved, Justice
Black was the primary exponent of the speech/conduct bifurcation. This
position no doubt grew from his recognition that almost all conduct
could be interpreted as involving an element of speech, making almost
no law enforceable unless the absolute protections of the first amendment were limited only to the speech itself, rather than extended to
45
the accompanying conduct.
On the other hand, Justice Douglas has emphasized the converse,
that almost all speech is accompanied by conductA0 and that a scrupulous search for some element of conduct to justify legislative regulation could lead to the infringement of first amendment freedoms. It
now appears that where conduct is essential to the communication of
the message, it constitutes speech and can be prohibited only under the
"clear and present danger" standard established in Chaplinsky. Where
the conduct is not essential, the state's interest in preserving the peace
might be satisfied by a lesser showing of a likelihood of disorder. Whatever the standard for finding a danger of breach of the peace, itseems
likely that in some form this interest will continue to serve as a valid
47
justification for flag abuse statutes.
The issue, of course, will not be whether a breach actually occurred,
but whether the defendant should reasonably have anticipated such a
44. In reversing the conviction, the Court concluded: -We ha'e becei
shn11 no
evidence that substantial numbers of citizens are standing read) to stike outtphzst.
cally at whoever may assault their sensibilities with execrations like that uttercd b%
Cohen." 403 U.S. at 23.
45. See Yarbrough, Justice Black and His Critics on Speech-Plus and Smbolic
Speech, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 257 (1974).
46. "The act of praying often imolhes bodN posture and mo~einent as icll as
utterances." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 455 (1)ougla, J.,(onct1iing).
47. Commentators who haie generally rejected other bases for Ltes-C statutes haw

accepted preserxation of peace as valid. See. e.g., Note. Flag Desecration-Thc Unttkd
Issue, 46 Notre Dame Law. 201 (1970); Comment. Flag Desecration Statuteiin Light
of U.S. v. O'Brien and the First Amcndnient, 32 U. Pitt. L. Re%. 513 (1971).
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result.' 8 The facts of Spence suggested no such danger there,', and
thus the Court was not required to address the legitimacy of this state
interest. However, given the fact that even pure speech can be regulated under certain narrow circumstances in the interest of public order, it seems highly probable that a flag abuse prosecution based on
the same interest could survive an O'Brien analysis and remain valid
after Spence.
Protection of Passersby.-The Spence Court reaffirmed the principle
that "the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas themselves are offensive to some of their hearers."50 The
further assertion, however, that "appellant did not impose his ideas
upon a captive audience," 51 may be a signal that in circumstances
where those who do not want to hear the message conveyed have no
way of avoiding it, flag abuse statutes may act to protect the public. In
Lehman v. Shaker Heights,52 handed down the same day as Spence, the
Court upheld a local statute prohibiting the public transit system from
accepting political advertising. It thus appears that a municipality may
protect the public from unwanted communication in a "captive audi.
ence" situation, despite the fact that the communication is clearly
within the protection of the first amendment. 53 While the likelihood
of many flag abuse cases involving a captive audience seems slight, a
flag abuse statute might be justified in such a case. 5'
Protecting the Flag.-Nearly seventy years ago the Supreme Court
asserted that the desire to protect a national symbol adequately justifies state regulation of flag use. 55 Although lower courts have employed that rationale frequently,5 6 few have attempted to identify the
government interest involved. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, attempted an explanation, reasoning that the right of a
48. See the reasoning of the court in People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. 2d 923, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 853 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 371 (1970).
49. 418 U.S. at 412.
50. Id., quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. at 592.
51. 418 U.S. at 412.

52. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
53. For a discussion of the right to be free from an unwanted nhemage, see
particularly the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas. Id. at 305-08. (Douglas, J..
concurring).
54. For an argument that the "right to escape" is the only right to be fce of
speech worthy of judicial approval, see Haiman, Speech v. Priac): Is There a Right
Not to Be Spoken To? 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 153 (1972).
55. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. at 41-43.
56. See, e.g., State v. Saulino, 29 Ohio Misc. 25, 27-28, 277 N.E.2d 580, 582 (1971):
State v. Bunch, 26 Ohio Misc. 161, 162. 268 N.E.2d 831, 832 (1970); State 1. Spente.
81 Wash. 2d 788, 799, 506 P.2d 293, 300 (1973). See also Justice White's concurring
opinion in Goguen that -one need not explain full) a phcnomcnon to tcognite its
existence." 415 U.S. at 587 (White, J., concurring).
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nation to establish a flag is all aspect of its somereignt', and that tile

"necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution empowers
the gov-

ernment to protect what it has the right to establish.57 This argument
is reminiscent of Justice White's contention in Goguen that the flag,
even when in the possession of a private citien, is "national property,"

a "monument" which the government may regulate.5 Justice White's
view seems to equate "national" with "governmental." If an intdividual
uses the flag only at the government's sufferance, it certainly follows
that any regulation of that use is justified.
Justice White's "national property" theorN suggests no limits oi
the scope of the government's power to regulate flag abuse. I:or example, the issue of how much resemblance a design must bear to the
original was disputed in Herrick v. Comnzontzealth." In that case,
a flag abuse conviction was reversed because the flag in question, similar
to the United States flag except that the stars were in a peace-s~mbol
configuration, was found not to be within the protection of the statute. 61
A flag abuse statute protecting an), flag which a reasonable person would
believe to represent the United* States flag"' seems defensible if the
purpose of the statute is to prevent possible breaches of the peace.
However, when a statute is designed to protect national property, it
is difficult to justify its use to regulate something other than the
American flag.62 The "national property" argument also raises the question whether the interest could be asserted by others besides the federal
government. If the flag may be regulated because the government which
created it has the power to protect it, the individual states have no
standing to assert a proprietary interest in the United States flag.

3

It is not, however, inconsistent to view the flag as "national property" and still assert that "[t]he flag has never been a trademark of
government." 64 If the flag belongs to the nation as a whole, it is arguably material in the public domain which can be used by any
57. United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 409 U.S. luI1
(1972).
58. 415 U.S. at 587 (White, J., concurring).
59. 212 Va. 789, 188 S.E.2d 209 (1972).
60. See also State v. Nicola, 182 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1971). But cf. State %. Saulinn,

29 Ohio Misc. 25, 277 N.E.2d 580 (1971).
61. Alabama has such a statute. Ala. Code tit. 14. § 192 (1967).
62. In Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971). the court struck
down a North Carolina statute which attempted to regulate any design %hich could
possibly be taken to resemble the flag. calling it "'uicoimonIN bad." and condemning
its attempt to appropriate the colors red, ulhite and blue, and the designs of stal S
and stripes.
63. The Supreme Court has held that statutes protecting the A.\ctican flag atr
not limited to those passed by Congress. Halter %. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
64. Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585, 588 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
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American to communicate his feelings toward his country. Noting that
the flag carries different messages for different people, the Spence
Court suggested limiting the state's interest to preventing the destruction or permanent disfigurement of the flag, so that it would not "lose
its capacity of mirroring the sentiments of all who view it."05 It would
seem then that one who does not destroy the flag, but merely uses it
as a means of communication, has nothing to fear from the state. The
Court has still to decide whether the general state interest in preserving
the flag sufficiently justifies statutes prohibiting desecration. 00
The extent of the government's power to regulate flag abuse may
be further clarified in the near future. The Supreme Court recently
disposed of several flag abuse cases which were pending before it at
the time of the Spence decision. The flag burning conviction involved
0 7
in State v. Farrell
was vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Spence, 6S despite the fact that Farrell was a clear case
of desecration, rather than misuse. People v. Sutherland 9 involved a
flag burning incident which prompted a passing motorist to stop his
car and try to extinguish the flames.7 0 Although this fact bolsters the
lower court's conclusion that the act posed a threat to public order
distinguishing it from Spence, Sutherland was similarly vacated and remanded for further considerationj'
The clearest indication that states may continue to regulate flag
abuse in certain instances came in the Court's disposition of Van Slyke
v. Texas.7 2 The defendant and other students were gathered in the
Commons of Rice University at the time of the Cambodia invasion.
Van Slyke initially blew his nose on the flag, which prompted another
student to tell him that he was breaking the law, and that lie intended
to report him if he would not stop. At that point Van Slyke unzipped
his pants and began to masturbate by rubbing his genitals on the flag.
His conviction in a Texas district court was upheld by the Court of
Criminal Appeals.7 4 His subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court was
65. 418 U.S. at 413.
66. The Spence Court commented in a footnote that this interest in preserving
the flag is directly related to expression; therefore, in the absence of any other
articulated government interest, a statute based thereon will not satisfy the four.
step O'Brien test. Id. at 414 n.8.
67. 209 NAV.2d 103 (Iowa 1973).
68. Farrell v. Iowa, 418 U.S. 907 (1974).
69. 9 Ill.
App. 3d 824, 292 N.E.2d 746 (1973).
70. Id. at 826, 292 N.E.2d at 747-48.
71. Sutherland v. Illinois, 418 U.S. 907 (1974). The lower court in Fatiell had
also relied on the likelihood of a breach of the peace. 209 N.W.2d at 107.
72. 418 U.S. 907 (1974).
73. Van Slyke v. State, 489 SAV.2d 590, 591-92 (Tex.Crim. App. 1973).
74. Van Slyke v. State, 489 SAV.2d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question on the same day
that the Court remanded Farrell and Sutherland. 75 While conclusions
must be cautiously drawn from a dismissal without opinion, V'an Slyke
does seem to indicate that all instances of flag abuse are not equally
entitled to first amendment protections.
Validity of Current Statutes.-The validity of the flag abuse statutes
possessed by all fifty states and the federal government-N warrant reexamination in light of Goguen and Spence. Almost all states77 have
some variant of the standard provision prohibiting certain treatment
of the flag short of physical destruction or mutilation.7 " After Goguen
and Spence, however, the presence of communicative content in the action will bar a prosecution based solely on the state's interest in preserving the flag.
A permissible conviction might possibly be based on protecting the
sensibilities of passersby if a "captive audience" situation exists, and
on a threat to breach of the peace if that threat actually exists. Those
75. 418 U.S. 907.
76. The federal flag abuse statute is 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1968). The state statutes
are: Ala. Code tit. 14, § 190 (1967); Alaska Slat. § 11.60.220 (1970): Ariz. Re%. Sat.
Ann. § 41-853 (Supp. 1973); Ark. Sat. Ann. § 41-1701 (1964); Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code
§ 614 (Vest Supp. 1974); Colo. Rev. Slat. Ann. § 40-11-204 (Supp. 1971); Conn. Gen.
Slat. Rev. § 53-258(a) (1971); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11.§ 1331 (1974); Fla. Slat, Ann.
§§ 256.05-06, 779.21 (1975); Ga. Code Ann. § 26-2202 (1972); Hawaii Re%. Sat. § 733-1.
-4,-6,-8 (1968); Idaho Code § 18-3401 (1972); Ill. Rev. Slat. ch. 5614. § 6 (Supp. 1974);
Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 10-506 to 10-509 (Burns 1970); Iowa Code Ann. § 32.1 (1967);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4114 (Supp. 1973); Ky. Rev. Slat. Ann. §§ 2.060, 2.990 (1971):
La. Rev. Slat. § 14:116 (1974); Me. Rev. Slat. Ann. tit.
1. §§ 253-54 (1964): Md. Ann.
Code art. 27, § 82-83 (1971); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 264. § 5 (Stpp. 1974): Mich.
Comp. Laws §§ 750.245-46 (1968); Minn. Slat. § 609A0 (Supp. 1974): Miss. Code Ann.
§ 97-7-39 (1972); Mo. Rev. Slat. § 563.750 (1953): Mont. Re%. Codes Ann. § 94-3581
(1969); Neb. Rev. Slat. §§ 28-1101 to 28-1103 (1964); Nev. Re%. Sat. § 201.290 (1973);
N.H. Rev. Slat. Ann. § 646 (Supp. 1973); N.J. Slat. Ann. §§ 2k:107-1. -2 j1969);
N.M. Slat. Ann. § 40A-21-4 (1972); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 136 (McKinie% 1968):
N.C. Gen. Slat. § 14-381 (Supp. 1974); N.D. Cent. Code § 12-07-04 (1960): Ohio Re%.
Code Ann. § 2921.05 (1953); Okla. Slat. Ann. tit. 21, §§ 371-73 (1971): Ore. Re%. Slat.
§ 166.075 (1973); Penn. Slat. Ann. tit.
18 § 2102 (1973); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-15.2
(1969); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-532 (1962); S.D. Compiled Lais Ann. § 22-9 (1967: T1enn.
Code Ann. §§ 39-1601 to 39-1606 (1955); Tex. Re%. Civ. Sat. art. 6139 (1970): Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-14-1 to 76-14-4 (1953); Vt. Sat. Ann. tit.
13, §§ 1901-06 (1974: Va.
Code Ann. §§ 18.1-423 to 18.1-428 (1974); Wash. Rev. Code kinn. §§ 9.86M.0-30 (Supp.
1975); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-1-8 (1966); Wis. Slat. § 946.05-06 (Supp. 1974): NVo.
Stat. Ann. § 6-106 (1959).
77. California, Colorado, Hawaii, North Carolina, Ohio atnd Oiegon limit offcnses to physical abuse of the flag. See note 76 supra.
78. Idaho Code § 18-3401 (1972) is tNpical. In releiant part itrcad%:
Any person who in any manner . . . shall cause to be placed all\ uiod. figure.
mark, picture, design, drawing. . . . upon any flag . . . of thilUnited States . . .
or shall expose or cause to be exposed to public \few any such flag . . . or
cast contempt, either by words or acts, upon alny such flag,...
shall be punished
by a fine ... or imprisonment ....
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states which prohibit improper use also prohibit commercial exploitation of the flag. 70 These statutes are probably not affected by Goguen
and Spence, and the longstanding principle that commercial advertising
is not entitled to the full range of first amendment protections 8O has
yet to be reconsidered.
Finally, all fifty states and the federal government have statutes
prohibiting actions which interfere with the physical integrity of the
flag. 8' These statutes will probably be completely unaffected by Goguen,
since they generally enumerate with specificity the actions considered
objectionable. They should also be less affected by Spence than should
improper use statutes, since acts falling under the former have a greater
potential to incite violence.
II
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: LIBEL

The increasing tension between an individual's right to protect his or
her reputation, and freedom of the press, received its most recent resolution by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.8 2 Previously,
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan s3 the Supreme Court had articulated a first amendment bar to libel recoveries by "public officials,"
absent a showing of "actual malice."8 4 The scope of the protection afforded publishers was expanded, initially to include news about "public
figures," 8 5 and finally was held to encompass "all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern without
regard for whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous."8 1
79. Idaho Code § 18-3401 (1972) reads in relevant part:
Any person who ... shall expose to public view, manufacture, sell, give away,
... any article or substance . . . upon which shall have been printed, painted,
attached or otherwise placed, a representation of any such flag, ... to ad.
iertise, call attention to, decorate, mark, or distinguish the article . . . shil be
punished by a fine ... or imprisonment ....
80. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). But see Lehman v. Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 308 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Again, Idaho Code § 18-3401 (1972) is typical. In relevant part it leads:
Any person who . . . shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile or defy, trample
upon, or cast contempt, either by words or act, upon any such flag
. shall
be punished by a fine. .. or by imprisonment ....
82. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
83. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
84. Under this rule, liability does not attach unless the plaintiff can proic
publication of defamatory falsehood in the knowledge that it is false or with recklcss
disregard for whether it is true or not. Id. at 279-80. For the commoi law treatmnent
of libel, see text accompan)ing notes 131-32 infra.
85. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
86. Rosenbloom v. Metroniedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,,44 (1971).
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This final extension by a fragmented Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia87 was disapproved by the Gertz Court,"8 which established new
standards for publishers' liability. Specifically, the Court withheld first
amendment protection from alleged defamers of "private individuals."b a
Included in that class are those other than "public personalit[ies]," who
have not been significantly involved in the newsworthy event.90 While
the Court's action afforded publishers less protection than they would
have had under an extension of the New York Times standard,," it
simultaneously circumscribed the states' ability to impose liability. Under new standards promulgated by the majority, the states may neither
impose liability without fault, 92 nor permit recovery of presumed or
punitive damages in the absence of "actual malice2."93
Nuccio, a Chicago policeman, was prosecuted for homicide and
convicted for the second degree murder of a youth named Nelson. Petitioner Elmer Gertz was retained by the Nelson family to represent
them in civil litigation against Nuccio. Respondent publishes American
Opinion, a monthly outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. In
an effort to alert the public to a nationwide communist conspiracy to
discredit the police, the managing editor commissioned an article on
the murder trial of officer Nuccio. As counsel for the Nelson family
in the civil litigation, petitioner played no part in the criminal proceeding.9 4 However, despite the remoteness of Gertz's relationship to the
proceeding, an article published in March of 1969 accused him of being
an architect of the alleged "frame-up" and a "Comnimunist-fronter,'" 9
and contained a number of other equally inaccurate representations.01
The managing editor made no effort to verify or substantiate the charges
against petitioner.0 7
In entering judgment for respondent notwithstanding the jury's
verdict,98 the district court had accepted respondent's contention that
87. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
88. 418 U.S. at 346.
89. Id. at 347.
90. Id. at 352.
91. Id. at 348.
92. Id. at 347.
93. Id. at 350.
94. Id. at 325-26.
95. Id. at 326.
96. The article labeled Gertz a "Leninist" and implied thit he had a criminal
record, as well as that he had been an official in a Marxist league which advocated
violent seizure of the go~ernment. In addition to these serious inaccuracies. tie
publication contained the implication that the National Law~crs (uild. of ihich
petitioner had been a member and officer 15 )ears before, had been primnarilk responsible for the 1968 demonstrations in Chicago. Id.
97. Id. at 327.
98. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. 111. 1970).
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the first amendment privilege contained in the New York Times standard protected any public issue without regard to the status of the person
defamed therein. 90 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 100 thereby endorsing the district court's anticipation of the
Rosenbloom plurality's reasoning.' 01
Justice Powell's majority opinion is premised on a distinction between false ideas, which are absolutely protected by the first amendment,
and false statements of fact, which, although not constitutionally valiable, are concededly "inevitable in free debate."1 02 The protection to
be afforded the latter is determined by balancing the desire to avoid press
self-censorshipo 3 against the state's interest in compensating individuals
for harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehoods. 0 4 Rejecting a
case-by-case accommodation,' 05 Justice Powell set forth two principal
reasons for not requiring private individuals to meet the "actual malice"
standard established for "public officials" in New York Times and
adopted for "public figures" in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.
The Court first found that the greater access to effective channels
of communication enjoyed by "public" individuals makes "self-help" a
more realistic possibility for them than for "private" persons.10 0 The
Court found its second justification in a combination of society's interest in the careful scrutiny of "anything that might touch on an
official's fitness for office," 1 07 and the voluntary action of the "public"
person in assuming a position which invites attention and comment.1 08
Therefore, the private individual is at once more vulnerable and more
deserving of recovery. Finally, in addition to being overly solicitous
99. Id. at 999.
100. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
101. [Pecitioner's] considerable stature . . . undermine [sic] the . . . assumption
that he is not a "public figure" . . . . Nevertheless, for purposes of decision we
make that assumption and test the availability of the claim of privilege by the
subject nature of the article.
Id. at 805.
A district court had also held that the Roscnbloom privilege extends to an)
newsworthy item. Goldman v. Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Scc
also Justice Douglas' comment that once an article is published, i prCsumption
arises that the subject is worthy of public interest. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 329-30 11.6.
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
102. 418 U.S. at 430.
103. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); See also NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
104. 418 U.S. at 342.
105. Id. at 343.
106. Id. at 344.
107. Id. at 344-45, quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (196.1).
108. 418 U.S. at 345.
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of the press,' 09 Rosenbloom was officially' rejected as putting the state
and federal courts in the difficult position of deciding what issues are
of adequately general or public interest to claim the first amendment
privilege." 0
Justice Brennan argues vigorously in dissent that the "actual malice"
standard established in New York Times represents the allowable first
amendment accommodation to the protection of individual reputations.
He contends persuasively that the "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 1 1 which the first amendment was designed to
protect, does not vary according to whether an actor in the newsworthy
event is a "public" or "private" individual.1 1 2 Denying any appreciable
difference in media access between most "public" and "private" individuals, he argues that coverage depends on the newsworthiness of the
event,11 3 and that retractions and counterarguments never merit the
same attention as the story in the first instance. 1 " Therefore, one class
of persons is no more vulnerable to defamation damage than the other.
Finally, "private" individuals are no more deserving than "public"
individuals of protection by reason of the voluntariness of their prominence, since that factor is similarly unrelated to first amendment values.11 5
The crucial conceptual difference between the Rosenbloom and
Gertz approaches is reflected in Justice Brennan's emphasis on the news.
worthy event and Justice Powell's emphasis on the libel victim. The
former would shield the private issues in everyone's life,'1 0 while the
latter would protect "private" individuals regardless of the issue.117 Since
it is information about public affairs which goes to the essence of self109. Id. at 346. See Constitutional Law: Freedom of the Press. 1972/73 Ann.
Survey Am. L. 185, 194. But see Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 57 (Black. J., dissenting):
Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at 172 (Black, J., dissenting); Gert:, 418 US. at
357-58 (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 295 (Black,

J., concurring).
110. 418 U.S. at 346.
111. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at
270 (emphasis Justice Brennan's).
112. 418 U.S. at 363, quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 46.
113. 418 U.S. at 363-64.
114. Id. As Professor Kalheu notes, the need foi a law of libel a ii.cfhuiotihe
fact that the truth never catches up with a lie. Kalven, The Reasonable Mall

and

the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 S. Ct. Re%. 267. 300. Although
Justice Powell recognized this argument, he found that the iuadeqiunc of rebuttal
standing alone does not render it au irrelevant consideration. 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
115. 418 U.S. at 365.
116. Id. at 364, quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43. Note Justice Bicniall's
comment that some aspects of the lies of e\en public figuies fall(ttLide tle atca
of public concern, citing Griswold \. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Rosenbloom,
403 U.S. at 48.
117. 418 U.S. at 345.
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government," 8 the Rosenbloom standard more effectively serves the interests secured by the first amendment. 1 9 The distinction between
issues of public and private concern appropriately safeguards both the
people's "right to know" and the individual's "right to privacy."
Finally, Justice Brennan responded to the criticism that the Rosenbloom standard would force ad hoc determinations of what constitutes
issues of "public concern" with a reminder of the traditional judicial
12 1
function.120 Not only are courts the intended arbiters of such disputes,
but there is less danger of press self-censorship in forcing publishers to
anticipate the "uncertain contours of the 'general or public interest'
concept,"' 22 than in allowing state legislatures to impose liability for
12 3
negligent falsehood.
Although "public figure" seems no more amenable to untroubled
judicial construction than "matters of public or general concern," the
Court's attempted clarification of the former is instructive. Justice
Powell specified alternative bases upon which the characterization of
one as a "public figure" might rest. The first type "achieve[s] such
pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all
purposes and in all contexts";' 2 4 the second "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues."125 While both
118. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
119, Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 41, 44 (Brennan, J.). See The Supreme Court, 1970
Term, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 3, 224 (1971).
Gertz departs from the rationale of New York Times (see text accompanying note
111 supra) and risks inhibiting arguably protected speech on issues of public concern.
The proposition that a publication discussing public affairs which is made without
"actual malice" is constitutionally protected was supported by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Black, Blackmun and Brennan in Rosenbloom. 403 U.S. at 44, 57. Justice
Douglas, who took no part in Rosenbloom, affirmed that proposition in Gertz. ,118
U.S. at 355-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Blackmun found it illogical to extend first amendment protection to public officials and figures, but not to the discussion of public issuc.
he concurred because he thought that removal of presumed and punitive damages
would give the media adequate "breathing space" and that a definitive majority
ruling was needed in the libel area to dispel uncertainty. Id. at 353-54 (Blckmin,
J., concurring).
120. 418 U.S. at 369. Note also the possibility of a similar difficulty in the
courts' efforts to decide the allowable kinds of damages under the Gertz standard.
See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 53; Note, The Expanding Constitutional l'rotection
for the News Media from Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the New
Synthesis, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1547, 1578 (1972).
121. There now exists a sizeable body of libel cases which ia~c turned on the
determination of whether various events were matters of public concern. For a lit
of collected cases see Note, supra note 120, at 1560.
122. 418 U.S. at 369.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 351.
125. Id.
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would be called upon to prove "actual malice" under Rosenbloom,1 26
Gertz would require only the first type to meet this standard unfailingly.' 27 The duty of the second would be determined by "the nature
and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation."1 28 Frequently, if an event is a
matter of public concern, the individuals involved will qualify as public
figures. The newsworthiness of the event is still critical to the Gertz
analysis; it merely adds the condition that the individual have a sufficient relationship to the event to justify the damage to his reputation.
The importance of the distinction is nicely illustrated by the Gertz
case itself. Elmer Gertz was held not to be a public figure because the defamation involved a criminal trial in which he had taken no part.12 Had
he "thrust himself into the vortex of [the] public issue,"lat 0 however, he
might have achieved the status of a public figure. Future defendants
may well stress the defamed individual's participation in the public
issue or event in an effort to broaden the public figure test into a
concept approaching a public issue analysis.
Publishers may take some comfort, however, in the major changes
mandated by the Gertz Court in the degree of fault needed to establish
liability, as well as the permissible measure of damages. Traditionally,
libel was a tort of strict liability; after a writing was found libelous,
damages were presumed. 3 1 "Special" damages could also be proved,
126. 403 U.S. at 44, 55.
127. 418 U.S. at 342-43.

128. Id. at 352.
129. Id. Respondent also argued that Elmer Gertz was a public official, because
several years prior to the defamation he had been appointed to. and scrcd briefly
on, a Chicago mayoral housing committee. Further he contended that Gertz was a
"de facto public official" by virtue of his appearance at the coroner's inquest rep.
resenting his "client's" family. In rejecting both contentions. the Court found that
Gertz had not held remunerative government office at the time of the defamationl.
and cautioned that respondent's second argument would distort the public official
category by sweeping in all lawyers under the New York Times rule as officers o[
the court. Id. at 351. Specifically, the Court emphasized the fact that Gertz "took
no part in the criminal prosecution of Officer Nuccio." id. at 332, and therefore
was not a public figure. This is especially interesting in light of tile fact that the
Supreme Court sanctioned the Seventh Circuit's rejection of a highly analogous argument made by Gertz in the court of appeals. Id. at 331-32 1.4. He contended
that the defamatory charge against him concerned no issue of public concern be.
cause he had not participated in the criminal proceeding upon which the article
focused. In rejecting this argument, the court warned against permitting the actual
falsity of a statement to determine whethcr or not its publisher is entitled to the
benefit of the New York Tintes ule. 471 F.2d at 806. Alhthgh (,crt.
iii,l
oline.
ment in the criminal proceeding shielded him front the status of a public figure,
he was not allowed to plead it as separating him from any issue of public conccrn.
Thus, a publisher's ultimate liability may well turn oln a factual inaccuracq.
130. 418 U.S. at 352.
131. W. Prosser, Torts 762, 772-73 (4th ed. 1971).
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and punitive damages were allowed.13 2 Justice Powell read the first
amendment to hold that "private" individuals must demonstrate negligence before any liability will be imposed for libelous publications
13 3
which make "substantial danger to reputation apparent."
Although this relaxation of a fault standard was intended to shield
the press from the rigors of strict liability, 3 4 the "elusive" 13 5 nature of
a negligence test arguably could saddle the press with the "intolerable
burden" of guessing before publication whether a jury will find the
publisher's steps reasonable.13 6 Furthermore, the flexibility inherent in
the concept of reasonable care carries the danger that a jury will use it
to suppress those "vehement attacks" deserving of constitutional protection, a danger Justice Brennan thinks far greater than jurors suppressing
opinion through the imposition of presumed and punitive damages.13t
Finally, the burden of proof for a negligence standard might well be
that of a preponderance of the evidence, in contrast to the clear and
convincing showing required by the New York Times. 138 A preponderance standard suggests that an erroneous verdict in either party's
favor would be equally serious.130 In fact, an error in favor of the libel
plaintiff has traditionally been viewed with more alarm. 1 10
Justice White, in dissent, attacked the negligence standard from a
totally different perspective, decrying the need to prove negligence as
an additional burden on libeled plaintiffs attempting to vindicate them4
selves.' '
Limiting recovery to actual damages, the Gertz Court disallowed
an award of presumed and punitive damages by any private defamation
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less rigorous standard than
proof of actual malice.' 4 2 Justice Powell felt that an award of presumed
damages in excess of actual injury would magnify any possibly inhibitory effect on the media, while an award of punitive damages would
132. Id. at 760-62.
133. 418 U.S. at 347-48.
134. Id. at 348.
135. Id. at 366 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 389 (1967).
136. Id. at 360, 366 (Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Ilofessor Kalven suggests that there is no place in the first amendment world for the "reasonably prudent
man." Kalven, supra note 114, at 303. But see Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at
158-59, wherein the Court held that a factor such as the necessity for rapid dissemination of news could be considered in determining the reasonable care standard.
137. 418 U.S. at 367.
138. 376 U.S. at 285-86.
139. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
140. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50.
141. 418 U.S. at 375-76.
142. Id. at 349.
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contain the same danger, in addition to being irrelevant to the state's
43
interest in compensating loss of reputation.'
Although not defined, "actual injur)" was deemed to include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. 44 Not unmindful of the
dangers of juries' discretion, Justice Powell noted that they might attempt to "punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate indi14
viduals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact. 5
The principal opponents of this standard took very different approaches in dissent. Justice White faulted the "actual injurN" requirement because damage to reputation is difficult to prove, thereby jeopardizing the chance that a libeled individual will be adequately compensated. 146 After all, concluded the Justice, punitive damages and the
1 47
Jusfirst amendment have coexisted for almost two hundred years.
tice Brennan, on the other hand, thought the broad-ranging examples
of "actual injury" would give the jury a "formidable weapon" for punishing expression of unpopular views.1 48 He reiterated his persuasive
opinion in Rosenbloom that it is the very possibility of having to engage in litigation, rather than the size and frequency of awards, which
results in media self-censorship. 40
Gertz provides a definitive answer to the constitutional question
equivocally resolved in Rosenbloom. The first amendment does not require that a private individual show actual malice before he may recover for damage to his reputation arising from a libelous publication
of general or public interest.1 0 The decision reveals a Court badly fragmented over whether the threat of suits by private individuals claiming
to have been libeled while the press was discussing a matter of public
concern will take away the "breathing space" necessary for first amendment expression to flourish. 5 1
143. Id.
144. Id. at 350.
145. Id. at 349.
146. Id. at 594.
147. Id. at 398.
148. Id. at 367.
149. Id. at 367-68, quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52-53.
150. 418 U.S. at 345-46.
151. Justice White contended that toda)s %igorous press, concentrated in a fe%%
powerful hands, would not be easily intimidated by the threat of suits, citing the
absence of any data tending to show press self-ccnsorship. Id. a( 390 (White, J.
dissenting). Justice Blackmun felt that the slight practicnl effect u*hich Gritz might
have on journalists would be offset by the renosal of presumlcd arid punitic
damages. Id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring). On the other hand. Justice Douglas
and Brennan dissented -igorously that Gertz would certainly lead to press self
censorship, id. at 360, 366 (Douglas & Brcnnan, JJ.. dissenting), a csuilt ulhchi
Chief Justice Burger also found conceihable. Id. at 335 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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While Rosenbloom would more adequately have protected the first
amendment freedoms discussed in New York Times,152 the "public
concern" standard there articulated might virtually have eliminated the
law of libel. 153 Gertz, on the 'other hand, is not without press safeguards: negligence must be proved;'5 4 the potentially defamatory nature of the statement must be apparent;15 3 and only actual damages
may be recovered.15 6 Unfortunately, these protections may not be adequate compensation for effectively entrusting the scope of a publisher's
first amendment privilege to the discretion of a jury.
III
DUE PROCESS: CRIMINAL JURISDICTiON BY KIDNAPPING

Until the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided United
States v. Toscanino,5t it was virtually undisputed that law enforcement officials could forcibly abduct a criminal defendant and take him
into a particular jurisdiction without jeopardizing the validity of a sub.
sequent conviction against him.158 In a seeming rejection of established
Supreme Court doctrine, 159 the court of appeals held that if the defendant could substantiate his allegations of kidnapping and torture, due
process would require a court to decline jurisdiction "where it has been
acquired as the result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and
unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights."100 Furthermore, in a surprising extension of constitutional rights, the court found
an alien entitled to invoke the protection of the fourth amendment1 '
152. See notes 116-19 supra and accompanying text.
153. But see Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 49, where the plurality disavowcd an) dcsile
to eliminate the law of libel.
154. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
155. 418 U.S. at 348. The Court limited its holding by noting that diffeuint con.
siderations would be involved "if a State purported to condition civil liability oil a
factual misstatement whose content (lid not warn a reasonably prudent editor oI
broadcaster of its defamatory potential." Id.
156. Id. at 349. Presumed and punitihe damages may still be rccocied if the
publisher acts with "actual malice." Id.
157. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
158. See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 933-36 (Ist Cir, 1918), celt.
denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961).
159. In both Kcr v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), and Frisbic v. Collins, 312 U.S.
519 (1952), the Court had held that such forcible abductions neither affected the
court's jurisdiction, 119 U.S. at 444; 342 U.S. at 522, nor deprived the defendant of
any constitutional rights, 119 U.S. at 440; 342 U.S. at 522.
160. 500 F.2d at 275.
161. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violatcd ....
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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even outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.10 2 Eight
months later, the Second Circuit reassessed its previous position and held,
in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,1 3 that in the absence of any
allegations of physical abuse, such abductions do not violate a defendant's right to due process. Thus, law enforcement officials may still
kidnap a criminal defendant, take him into a particular jurisdiction, and
obtain a valid conviction against him, so long as they do not abuse him
physically.
Toscanino was a citizen of Italy living in Uruguay. At his trial,
he alleged that he had been kidnapped in Uruguay by paid agents
of the United States Government, removed to Brazil and eventually
taken to Brasilia. There, he claimed to have been tortured for seventeen days by his captors and interrogated by a member of the United
States Department of Justice. Finally, he was allegedly drugged and
placed in a plane bound for New York; he was arrested on board the
airplane in the United States.16 4 Although Toscanino challenged the
validity of the proceedings, t 65 the district court found his allegations
irrelevant to its jurisdictional power.1 60
Toscanino also moved at trial1 67 to compel the prosecution to affirm or deny that he had been illegally wiretapped in Uruguay. Upon
the prosecutor's representations that no electronic surveillance had been
employed, the trial court ruled that a hearing on the issue was unnecessary. 68 Toscanino appealed his subsequent conviction for conspiring to
import heroin.169
The Due Process Analysis.-The decision in Toscanino rested pri162. 500 F.2d at 280.
163. No. 74-2084 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 1975), cert. denied. 43 U.S.L.W. 3636 (U.S. Jtnc
3, 1975).
164. 500 F.2d at 269-70.
165. Id. at 268.
166. Id. at 271.
167. See id. at 270-71. This motion is authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970).
which provides:
(a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before an% ort . .c . of the
United States(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieed that cidence is inadmissible betame
it is the primary product of an unlawful act ...
the opponent of Ehe
claim shall affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged unlawful
act;...
(b) As used in this section "unlawftul act" means an) act the use of an% cldxtronic, mechanical, or other device . . . in %iolation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States ....
168. See 500 F.2d at 271.
169. Id. at 268-69.
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marily on due process groundslTO The court noted 1 7 ' that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of due process had expanded since the leading
"abduction" decision of Frisbie v. Collins.1 72 Due process, previously
satisfied by fair procedure at trial, 173 had come to mean that in a
criminal prosecution the government should not be allowed to utilizc
the products of its own deliberate, illegal conduct.
As seen by the Court, the liberalizing trend had its genesis in
Rochin v. California.174 In that case, police had pumped the stomach
of the defendant to recover two morphine capsules which he had swallowed when the police broke into his home without a warrant. 7 5 In
reversing Rochin's conviction TGthe Court barred the government from
utilizing the products of its illegal action, 177 and recognized that "the
requirements of the due process clause inescapably impose upon this
Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings [resulting in a conviction]."'17 8 It should be noted, however, that
the Court was willing to find such a violation only where the government's conduct "shock[ed] the conscience." 1 7 The Second Circuit found
the Court's expanded approach to due process in the context of criminal
procedure further illustrated by Mapp v. Ohio,180 Miranda v. Arizona,' 8'
Wong Sun v. United States1 82 and, most recently, United States v.
Russell. 8 3
170. Id. at 272-75. The requirement of due process in actions by the United States
Government is derived from the following language in the fifth amendment to the
liberty, or property,
Constitution: "[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life,
without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V.
171. 500 F.2d at 271-72.
172. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
173. Id. at 522.
174. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
175. Id. at 166.
176. Id. at 174.
177. The lower court had found, on the record, that the arresting officers had
acted illegally. Id. at 166-67.
178. Id. at 169.
179. Id. at 172.
180. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In this case, the Court relied upon the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to exclude illegally seized evidence in state
prosecutions. Id. at 655-57.
181. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Relying upon the due process guarantee of the fifth
amendment, the Supreme Court required the exclusion of any statements made by
a criminal defendant while in police custody unless specific, extensive prccautlion
had been taken to protect the defendant's right against self.incrimination. Id. at
467-79, 491-99.
182. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In this case, the Court held inadmissible statenment,
made by the defendant at the time of his illegal arrest, id. at 484.87, as wiell
as
drugs seized from a third person as the result of such statmcnts, Id. at 487.88.
183. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). The defendant herein raised all entrapment defense.
since a federal agent had supplied him with a scarce noncontraband substance
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Although these cases clearly establish an "expanded" view of due
process which looks beyond the events of the trial, the Second Circuit's
4
reliance on Rochin is troublesome. Rochin was decided before Frisbie.18
If Rochin signalled a developing due process trend, it should have been
applied to Frisbie. In fact, neither the briefs of the parties,18 5 nor the
opinion of the court, mentioned the Rochin doctrine. Although the
Court assumed that the alleged kidnapping was a violation of federal
law,' 8 6 it merely recited that due process is satisfied by fair procedure
at trial. 187 Some commentators' 8 8 have suggested that the Court was
reluctant to use what was then a new doctrine to overturn both its
own precedent and similar decisions by many state courts.lt s Ultimately,
it seems that Frisbie was incorrectly decided. Not only had the Court
previously looked beyond the trial to find violations of due process, 10
but the blackjacking in Frisbie should have satisfied the "shocks the
conscience" standard articulated in Rochin.101
Accordingly, in deciding Lujan, the Second Circuit adhered to the
principle that due process considerations go beyond the events of trial;
Toscanino was distinguished on its facts. Lujan alleged that he had
been lured from his native Argentina into Bolivia, where he had been
taken into custody by the Bolivian police acting as paid agents of the
United States. At no time did the police formally charge him, or did the
United States request his extradition. After being held for a few days,
he was put on an airplane bound for New York, where he was arrested
by federal agents acting pursuant to a warrant on charges of conspiring
to import heroin. Although there were no allegations of beatings or
necessary to manufacture the contraband drug upon which his com iction rested. A.though the Supreme Court did not find a violation of due process, it did say that
it might "some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principlcs would absolutely
bar the government from imoking the judicial processes to obtain a coniction."
Id. at 431-32.
184. Although the Court notes this sequence, it does not seem to consider it a
problem. 500 F.2d at 273.
185. 1951 U.S. Briefs Docket No. 331.
186. 342 U.S. at 522-23.
187. Id. at 522.
188. Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State oer a Defendant Based upon Presence
Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 91. 99 (1953): Alien. Due Proccs
and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. Re%. 16, 27 (1953).
189. See, e.g., State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 117 (1835); Ex parte Barker, 87 Ala. 4.

6 So. 7 (1889).
190. In both Brown %. Mississippi. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). awl Watt, %. Indiana.
338 U.S. 49 (1949), the Supreme Court examined the circumstances surtounding
pretrial confessions and reversed on due process gro inds the coumictions ulXm which
they were based.
191. Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464, 465 (6th Cir. 1951).
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torture,192 he appealed from an order dismissing his petition for habeas

corpus. 193 The Second Circuit held that in the absence of any allegations of torture, a "mere" kidnapping was not sufficiently shocking to
constitute a violation of due process.' 0 '
The Second Circuit's use of the "shocks the conscience" standard
to measure due process violations is questionable. Although the Rochin
court required egregious government misconduct before it would sustain
a due process violation, subsequent opinions have looked only to whether
a specific provision of the Bill of Rights has been violated. 19 5 The outrageous circumstances of Toscanino's abduction enabled the Second
Circuit to avoid a direct holding on this issue. However, the Toscanino
court did suggest that "[due process] has been extended to bar the government from realizing directly the fruits of its own deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness in bringing the accused to trial."' 9 0 According to
this concept of due process, 9 7 the circumstances of Lujan's kidnapping
should have been held to invalidate his conviction as well, even in the
absence of physical abuse.' 9 8
This analysis can be criticized in light of a recent Supreme Court
holding which indicates that extensive government involvement in illegal activity may not, by itself, violate the defendant's due process
rights.' 99 Further distinguishing Toscanino from the Supreme Court de.
192. No. 74-2084 at 1198-1200.
193. Id. at 1197.
194. Id. at 1204-05.
195. The Rochin standard was not used in imposing the Mapp or Wong Sun
aspects of the exclusionary rule on the states. See notes 180 and 182 supra. Nor
has the Court resorted to this standard in applying other constitutional piotcctLios
against the states through the due process clause, as Miranda demonstrates. See note
181 supra. See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
196. 500 F.2d at 272, citing, inter alia, Mapp, wong Sun, and Miranda.
197. This "due process" seems more consistent with the phrase a% used in the
Magna Carta, where it means "by the law of the land." 391 U.S. at 169 (Black, J.,
concurring).
198. The kidnapping laws of two countries iwere iiolatcd. No. 71-2081 at 1205:
500 F.2d at 276. See also the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201, as amended
by Act of Oct. 24, 1972, 86 Stat. 1072. The agents involved could have been cxtradited for kidnapping. See Collier v.Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17 (,4th Cir. 1931): Villaical
v. Hammond, 74 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1934). The provisions of at least two ticatics
of the United States were breached. See notes 229-30 infra and accompanying text.
The seizures violated international law. O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure andliregultr
Extradition, 36 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 279, 280 (1960). But see No. 71-2081 at 1205-09
(Kaufman, C.J.). The normal and legal mode of obtaining jurisdictioi over (1feIdaIt%
in other states is through an extradition treaty or reciprocity. Garcia-Moia. CihiniI
Jurisdiction of a State over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign Cotiy by Foice oi
Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 Ind. L.J. 427 (1957).
199. Although the Court found the agent's conduct in Russell not to be illegal.
411 U.S. at 430, it was certainly substantial in olemnent in the crime, prolihly
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cisions upon which the Second Circuit relied is the fact that the cited
authorities all involve the violation of specific constitutional guarantees. 200 However, the policy of denying the prosecution the fruits of its
own illegal conduct has long been urged as the better view; 2 11it would
both deter the government from breaking its own laws "o2 and prserve
the court's integrity. 203 The Second Circuit seemed to embrace such a
view in Toscanino.
Nevertheless, Lujan betrays a markedly lifferent posture. Ahhough
the Second Circuit disclaimed approval of such illegal government behavior2 0 4 and expressed its belief that "the likelihood of numerous
violations is not real,"205 the realities of international criminal proenough to haie constituted aiding and abetting had the agent been a prilate citizen.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970); Direct Sales C0. %. United States. 319 U.S. 703 (19-13);
Backun v.United States, 112 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1940).
Nor was the more plainly illegal conduct of the goveriment agents in United
States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), %acated and remanded for further
consideration, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), sufficient to %%arrant reversal on remand, 494 F_2d
562 (7th Cir. 1974), under the Russell standards. In Mrrath, gmerninent agents
infiltrated a counterfeit money ring to the point where they were super ising tie
printing and distributing of the bills. Id. at 1028. But see United States %.Otlulndo.
490 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974), wherein the Fifth Circuit held. despite Russell, that
government agents supplying contraband to a defendant constitutes entrapment. Id.
at 163-64.
200. Specifically, these guarantees are either the fourth amendment right against
search and seizure (Rochin, Mapp, Wiong Sun) or the fifth amendntt right against
self-incrimination (Miranda). Since Rochin the courts ha~e askcd if conduct "shocks
the conscience" where the due process clause is being giien independent content.
as in Russell and Lujan, and have "den[icd] the fruits of illegal action,," where a
specific constitutional prohibition is iiolhed. Although the Second Circuit held
that Toscanino was protected b- the fourth amendment. this conclusion isqtueUtioned
at notes 209-21 infra and accompanying text. The application of this double standard
leads to such arguably inequitable results as excluding probatihe e idcncc in a tnldt
trial because of an insufficient warrant (see. e.g.,
Coolidge %.Net% Hainiphiie, 403 I.
443 (1971)), while allowing the government to %iolate kidnapping laws and trcativin its efforts to obtain custody o~er a defendant.
201. The admonition of Justice Brandeis in Olhstead %.United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928), cited by the Second Circuit in Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 274. is patticnlatl.
apt here:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails
to observe the law scrupulously .... If the goerninent becomes a la%%brcakcr.
it breeds contempt for law ....to declare...that the goerninnct zna coiumit crimes in order to secure the comiction of a pri ate criminal iould bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
202. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206. 217 (1960): .Iapp, 367 U.S.
at 648.
203. See, e.g., Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222; Terr) %. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 12-13 (19t61.
204. No. 74-2084 at 1205.
205. Id. at 1209 n.9.
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cedures belie the court's protests. 200 Thus, after flirting briefly with a
sensible due process doctrine,20 7 the Second Circuit returned to the
nearly unanimous opinion of other American courts that such abduc20°
tions, by themselves, do not constitute violations of due process of law.
The Fourth Amendment Aspect.-The Second Circuit characterized
the government as "[h]aving unlawfully seized the defendant in violation of the Fourth Amendment."2 00 Had Toscanino been a United
States citizen kidnapped from one state to another, it seems clear that
such treatment would have violated his fourth amendment rights. 2 10
The court cited no authority even suggesting that aliens have fourth
amendment rights outside the United States, until it reached the issue
2
of wiretapping. 11
The trial court had denied Toscanino's motion to compel the government to affirm or deny his allegation of illegal wiretapping in Uruguay. 212 Although the Second Circuit found the federal wiretapping
statute2 13 inapplicable outside the United States, 2 14 it noted that the
law under which Toscanino had made his request defined "unlawful
206. The statement of the court should be compared to the reaction Lujan
evoked from the federal authorities, "who said the decision would make it less
difficult for them to conduct their program to combat narcotics smuggling." N.Y.
Times, Jan. 9, 1975, at 26, col. 1. At least one commentator noted that such abductions are quicker and less costly than formal extradition. Evans, Acquisition of Cus.
tody over the International Fugitive Offcnder-Alternatives to Extradition: A Survey
of United States Practice, 40 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 77, 94-95 (1964). The Chilean citizen
who claimed that he was forcibly abducted by Chilean officers acting at the direction
of a United States agent undoubtedly disagrees with the Second Circuit. A Ulitcd
States attorney admitted that they had held the wrong man, but disclaimed the abduction. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
207. See Judge Anderson's concurrence in Lujan:
The discussion in the majority opinion in Toscanino of the due process issue . . .
read[s], in my opinion, as if the kidnapping... standing alone, wouhl be sufficient to deprive the district court of jurisdiction.
No. 74-2084 at 1210. (Anderson, J., concurring).
208. State court precedents include State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 117 (1835); Ex parte
Barker, 87 Ala. 4, 6 So. 7 (1889). Two recent cases are of particular note. In United
States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973), a due process
argument vcry similar to that which prevailed in Toscanino was rejected. Id. at 7,t7.18.
The court felt bound by Ker and Frisbie. Thus, the Toscanino court's attempt to distinguish this case on treaty grounds, 500 F.2d at 279, is inapt. In United States v.
Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974), the Fifth Circuit deferred to Ker and Frisbie,
and suggested that Toscanino was a product of its unusual facts. Id. at 860.
209. 500 F.2d at 275.
210. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01 (1959); Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-88 (1958).
211. 500 F.2d at 268.
212. See note 167 supra.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1970).
214. 500 F.2d at 279.
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act" in part as "any act .. in violation of the Constitution. 2 1 5 Therefore, the court held that Toscanino was protected by the fourth amendment while in Uruguay, that the alleged wiretap was unreasonable, and
216
that his rights had been violated thereby.
The court cited no direct precedent for the proposition that an alien
has fourth amendment rights outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. Rather, it noted that United States citizens abroad, 217 as
well as aliens within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,218
enjoy the protection of the fourth amendment, and refused to distinguish
Toscanino's situation.2 19 The court has essentially defined the "people"
whose "rights" the fourth amendment protects as everyone in the
world.22 0 The court does attempt to limit its holding to the rights of a
defendant in a criminal proceeding. However, the import of its language
is unclear, 22 1 and the refusal of the Lujan court even to consider the
fourth amendment aspect of Toscanino further obscures its meaning.
Ker and Frisbie Distinguished.-The court's efforts to distinguish
Toscanino from Ker and Frisbie met with mixed success. The first distinction it pursued was based on the power of the federal courts to supervise the administration of federal criminal justice.2 22 Ker and Frisbie
215. 18 U.S.C. § 3504(b). For the text of this provision, see note 167 supra.

216. 500 F.2d at 280-81.
217. Id. at 280, citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Best v. United States,
184 F.2d 131 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1950).
218. 500 F.2d at 280, citing Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
219. No sound basis is offered in support of a different rule with respect to
aliens who are victims of unconstitutional action abroad, at least where the
government seeks to exploit the fruits of its unlawful conduct in a criminal
proceeding against the alien in the United States.
500 F.2d at 280.
220. For an indication that such a broad reading is unwarranted. see Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). Note also that the leading decisions granting
constitutional rights to aliens limit such protections to aliens within the territorial
lirmns of the United States. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228. 238
(1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Coyler v. Skeffington. 265
F. 17, 24 (D. Mass. 1920). But see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946) (Murphy.
J., dissenting). The cases which the court does cite in support of its broad inter.
pretation of the fourth amendment similarly exclude aliens residing outside the
territorial United States. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 5; United States v. Pink. 315
U.S. 203, 210-11, 228 (1942); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481,
486-87, 489 (1931); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922); Au Yi Lau v. United
States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d at 223; Best v. United States,
184 F.2d at 138.
221. It is unclear whether the fourth amendment rights of aliens exist only
for the narrow purposes involved in Toscanino, or whether the court intended to
articulate a broader right which may e~entually give rise to other rencdies. See. e.g.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
222. 500 F.2d at 276.
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are state court cases, whereas Toscanino and Lujan proceeded in a
2
federal district court and involved federal law enforcement procedures.. 2
The court argued, therefore, that the supervisory power could be exercised to decline jurisdiction in a case where government agents broke
laws to obtain the presence of the defendant. 22 4 Had the court decided
the case on this ground alone, it could have avoided any problems at22tendant upon a due process or fourth amendment analysis.
The court's second attempted distinction analogizes Toscanino's
abduction to the seizure of a ship outside the territorial limits of the
United States. 220 Where the government lacks power to seize by virtue
of a self-imposed limitation, the federal courts lack jurisdiction over the
dispute.2 27 Unfortunately, not only is the analogy flawed by the clear
and recognized distinction between admiralty jurisdiction and criminal
"22 9
law, 228 but the court's reliance on the charters of the United Nations

and the Organization of American States23 0 as constituting such a limi223. Thus, these cases, unlike Ker and Frisbie, fall within the doctrine of
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) that
judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence.
Id. at 340.
224. 500 F.2d at 276. The supervisory power spoken of in McNabb has been
invoked to enjoin a federal agent from testifying about illegally seized evidence iu
a state court, Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956), and to dismiss an indictment that should have been based on better evidence, United States v. Estepa, ,171
F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972). Thus, it seems clear that the courts could decline jurisdiction to prevent their implication in illegal activity.
225. In fact, the Supreme Court stated that the administrative standards, which
are the federal judiciary's duty to establish, are not satisfied by the traditional
safeguards of due process. 318 U.S. at 340.
226. 500 F.2d 277-79.
227. Were the cases actually comparable, the abduction would have fallen uinder
the rule of Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933). Cook involved a libel action
by the United States Government against a British ship. Il. at 108. Because the
United States had imposed a territorial limitation on its own authority by a treaty
with Great Britain, the Supreme Court reasoned that it lacked the power to sile
the ship and its courts lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. Id(.
at 121-22.
228, The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over suits in admiralty. U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970); The Ira M. Hedges, 218 U.S.
264, 270 (1910). It has long been a rule in admiralty that one cannot gain jurisdiction
over a ship by seizing it outside the territorial limits of the court's jurisdiction
and subsequently taking it inside those limits. The Patricia M. Behan, 299 F. 1019
(E.D.N.Y. 1924). Both Ker and Frisbie, as well as their progeny, clearly indicate
that no such rule exists for criminal jurisdiction. See note 189 supra.
229. Chatter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
The court found that the government's conduct had violated Article 2, paragraph 41
of the United Nations Charter. 500 F.2d at 277.
230. Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 19.18, [ratified
1951] 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. The court f,und that the government's conduct had violated Article 17 of the charter of twe Organization of
American States. 500 F.2d at 277.

HeinOnline -- 1974 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 298 1974-1975

Imaged with the Pemission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

tation is misplaced. It is questionable whether the prosisions of either
charter could be construed as seIf-executing, "-13

a necessary condition

before they may provide the basis for adjutlicating the rights of individuals.

232

However, in Lujan, the Second Circuit did not reject the idea that
a criminal defendant abducted into the jurisdiction might seek the pro.

tection of these treaties. Noting that Lujan had not alleged that either
Bolivia or Argentina had objected to his abduction, it invoked the rule
of international law that failure to object to a violation of sovereigntN
cures the violation.2 33 Thus, the court found no %iolation of international
231. In Sei Fujii ,. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 2-12P.2d 617 (1952, a icsdent alicu
alleged that the California alien land law had ben inalidatcd b% the United
Nations Charter. Although the court struck do%%n the law on other grounds, id.at
725-38, 242 P.2d at 622-30. it did hold that tlo%(I
particular ioxi ioii% of the United
Nations Charter were not self-executing, and theiefore could not operate to ,,oid a
local law. Id. at 721-25, 242 P.2d at 620-22. In so doing it reiteiated the goneaal
rule that
[i]n order for a treaty provision to be operative without the aid of implementing
legislation and to have the force and effect of a statute, it must appear that the
framers of the treaty intended to prescribe a rule that. standing alone, %%Jottld be
enforceable in the courts.
Id. at 722, 242 11.2d at 620. See also Head Mone% (a,,e. 112 U.S. 580. 1.s-99 (18$4-):
Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
It is similarly questionable whether the members of the Organization of Aicticait
States intended to create rights enforceable by priate indihidual%, since later articles
provide that "[a] special treaty will establish adequate procedures for the pacific
settlement of disputes." Charter of the Organization of .\mciican State-,. stlia note
230, Chapter 3, Article 23.
Those treaties which have been held to be self-executing specif% tilenature anl
extent of the rights granted therein. The Cook court found tile
iu%0 dtl treat, selfexecuting. 288 U.S. at 118-19. It reads in rele ant part:
Article II. (1) His Brittanic Majesty agrees that he uill raise no objcttion to
the boarding of pri ate vessels tinder the British flag outsidle the limits of te
ritorial waters by the authorities of the United States . . . for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the vessel or those on board aie eudeaxoring to import
alcoholic beverages into the United States ....
(3) The rights conferred by this article shall not be cci-cbd at a gicater distance from the coast of the United States . . . than can be traversed in one
hour by the vessel ....
Convention with Great Britain on the Pre\ention of Smuggling of lito\itating Li.
quors, Jan. 23, 1924, 43 Stat. 1761, T.S. No. 685.
See also Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (treat% concerning right of aliens to
hold land held self-executing); United States ex rel. Martinez- \ngosto %. .Msai,
232 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd on other grounds. 344 F.td 673 (2d Cir. 196
(treaty setting forth procedures for dealing with deserting seamen held self-\qLcuting); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929) (tlcaty concerning tle kints of tamt.to be levied upon aliens held self-executing).
232. E.g., Cook, 288 U.S. at 118-19.
233. No. 74-2084 at 1205-09, citing, inter alia. H. Kclscn. Principles of International Law 234 (Tucker ed. 1966). and the opinion in the kl:ihiai
ta-.C,
epo:lted at
6 ,M.Whiteman, Digest of International Law 1110 (1968).
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law, and refused to decide whether the existence of one might have
23 4
changed the outcome.
The Second Circuit found the cruelties to which Toscanino was
subjected to have defeated the jurisdiction of the federal district court. -" 35
Although this may provide an adequate and defensible legal remedy, it
leaves Toscanino with some practical problems. If he is returned to a
status quo ante, as the court suggests, 2a6 he is at least spared immediate
rearrest by American authorities. However, it seems likely that the
Uruguayan authorities, who were allegedly implicated in the plot from
its inception, 23 7 will rearrest Toscanino and either take measures of
their own or turn him over to American authorities again.23 8 Perhaps
with this possibility in mind, the Lujan court cautioned that the adoption of an exclusionary rule in these circumstances would "confer a total
immunity to criminal prosecutions."2 30 While an argument might be
made for such a rule on the clearly barbarous facts alleged in Toscanino,
it does seem a high price to pay in situations where the police behavior
2 40
is less brutal and the crime alleged more heinous.
Taken together, Toscanino and Lujan establish the rule in the
234. No.74-2084 at 1209.
235. This court characterized the action as an extension of the power of federal
courts to decline jurisdiction in civil cases where the defendant's presence has been
secured by force or fraud. 500 F.2d at 275. Such an analogy has been suggested by
commentators. See Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over a Defendant Based
upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 91, 104-05 (1953). Although evidence was simply excluded in Mapp, Miranda, and Wong Sun, that action
would not have provided Toscanino a sufficient remedy. See 500 F.2d at 275. Since
it was the defendant's presence that was made possible by the illegal government
conduct, that presence should be "excluded" by declining jurisdiction.
236. 500 F.2d at 275.
237. Id. at 269. It should be noted, however, that the Uruguayan police who
kidnapped Toscanino were acting ultra vires and that their government actually
condemned the act. Id. at 269-70.
238. It is not clear that principles of double jeopardy would bar Toscanino's
retrial. The usual rule in American jurisdictions is that a defendant may be retried
where the first conviction was set aside due to error in the proceeding. United States
v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964). Nor is retrial forbidden where a judge declares
a mistrial because of a "jurisdictional" defect in the indictment. Illinois v. Sonerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). But see United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
The practical problem faced by Toscanino is even greater for a defendant who
is kidnapped from one state to another. In such instances, the governor of each
state is constitutionally required to deliver up fugitives from justice to the state
with jurisdiction over the crime. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3182
(1970). Although one might argue that someone released for lack of jurisdiction is
not a fugitive, that position has been rendered irrelevant by the passage in many
states of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. Scott, supra note 188, at 92 n.7.
239. No. 74-2084 at 1209 n.9.
240. So long as the court uses the "shocks the conscience" standard to identify
due process violations, it need not confront this choice directly. See text accompanying
note 194 supra.
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Second Circuit that forcibly abducting and physically brutalizing a
criminal defendant will violate his due process rights and divest the
receiving jurisdiction of power to adjudicate the dispute.24 1 Although
Toscanino suggests that the proper standard for determining whether
due process has been violated is the more liberal one which looks to
the commission of unnecessary illegal acts by the government,2 42 Lujan
asks only whether the government's conduct "shocks the conscience."24 3
Fortunately, Lujan suggests that the more frequent occurrence of such
kidnappings might be cause for reconsideration. 2 "

ADDENDUM
As this article went to press, the Second Circuit affirmed a
narcotics conviction in United States v. Lira, No. 74-2567 (2d Cir.,
April 14, 1975). Despite the defendant's allegations of torture and
the Government's admission that it had requested the defendant's
expulsion from Chile and was advised of his arrest and place of
incarceration, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding
of insufficient government involvement. Thus, Toscanino was distinguished. In a concurring opinion, Judge Oakes, noting that six
more abduction cases were likely to come before the court, warned
that repeated abductions would invite the use of the McNabb su2
pervisory power to decline jurisdiction in such cases.. 13
241.
whether
able to
242.

It should be noted that the Lujan court specifically refused to decide
the dismissal of the indictment would have been required had Lujan been
allege and prove Bolivia's or Argentina's objection. No. 74-2084 at 1209.
See notes 196 and 207 supra and accompanying text.

243. See text accompanying note 194 supra.

244. No. 74-2084 at 1209 n.9.
245. See notes 223-24 and 204-06 supra and accowpanying text.
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